
ABSTRACTS

CLAUS OFFE

DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS FOR EAST EUROPEAN TRANSITIONS

This paper is divided in two main sections. The first section serves conceptual purposes. I lay out a dualist concept of institutions and contrast it to related concepts such as organization, norm, ritual, and convention. How do we recognize an institution, in the proper sociological sense, if we see it? The second part looks at institutions in a longitudinal perspective. What happens to them over time, how can we explain what happens, and how can we conceivably intentionally determine what happens to institutions and, as a consequence, to those living in or under these institutions?

„Institutions „ is a key conceptual tool in the social sciences. Sociology, political science, economics, but also the disciplines of history, anthropology, and law can hardly work without it. Moreover, the creation of institutions, or the building of new and „better” social, political, and economic institutions is generally considered to be the central practical problem that societies confront as they emerge from their thoroughly discredited past, such as post-authoritarian and, in particular, post-communist societies.

Institutions, in a word, inculcate duties and generate outcomes. In order to generate the outcomes, they must rely on cognitive and moral resources which in their turn, however, are not to be created by administrative fiat. „*There is no administrative production of meaning*“ (Habermas). Consequently, whoever wishes to advocate, design, construct, change, or criticize institutions will have to bear in mind this dualism and the inherent limits of potential control over meaning. There are two competing approaches in the social sciences which both fail to appreciate this dualism of institutions. On the one hand, „culturalists” and some sociological and philosophical „institutionalists” fail in that they advocate and explain certain institutions solely in terms of the *social norms* and values that institutions embody and manage to spread in their social domain, while ignoring the systemic „fit” between the institution and its environment. On the other extreme, utilitarians notoriously also fail to conceptualize institutions in a balanced way, as they place one-sided emphasis upon the

instrumental aspect of institutions. They advocate or defend institutions (such as the market, property rights, or the business firm) in terms of their efficiency-enhancing and hence utility maximizing effect, and they even explain the presence of certain institutions in given societies in terms of their evolutionary superiority, e.g. as to their capacity of economizing on transaction costs. Methodologically similar is the structure of some Marxist arguments, as they conceptualize at least some institutions as the direct and intended outcome of ruling class strategies to achieve exploitative distributional outcomes.

What the utilitarian, evolutionist and Marxist approaches amount to is a denial of the crucial conceptual difference between an „institution” and an „organization”. The latter, but not the former, can and do actually subordinate (in accordance with Weber’s notion of „purposive rationality”) „duties” to (expected) „outcomes”. In organizations „duties”, or authoritatively prescribed and enforced roles and rules, are assigned so as to achieve optimal outcomes.

The difference between an organization and an institution can be summed up in three points. (1) Organizational duties are *dyadic*, while institutional rules are *triadic*, i. e. established and enforced by „third parties” who are not part of the institutionalized interaction. (2) „Duties” are subordinate to intended outcomes in organizations, but stand at least on the same logical plane in institutions. (3) Organizational duties are much more restricted in their scope, validity, and impact upon the person involved; they are restricted to the range of discretion that institutions (such as property rights, marriage, political parties).

„Designed” institutions suffer from a dual handicap: They have an architect and they are successors. Two conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of this dual liability from which the activity of „founding” institutions suffers, hyper-rationality and the long arm of the past. As far as the first of these liabilities is concerned, the ideal situation for the „founding” of institutions seems to be one in which no explicit „*engineering*” is called for, but where there is a rich vegetation of inherited institutional patterns which already enjoy the allegiance of relevant actors — an allegiance that can be further cultivated by an activity that has been described as „*institutional gardening*”. But as far as the second of these liabilities is concerned, namely the „long arm of the past”, it is just the opposite conclusion that must be drawn: the more the situation conforms to a notion of *tabula rasa*, and the more the old routines are explicitly deprived of their validity, the more readily and easily will the newly designed set of institutions win the loyalty of constituents and unfold its ultimately beneficial functions. Would-be institution designers certainly cannot have it both ways.

ANDRÁS BOZÓKI

AN OUTLINE OF THREE POPULISM:
UNITED STATES, ARGENTINA AND HUNGARY

In this paper an attempt is made to give the outlines of the historical description of the socio-political movements of three countries. However different these countries may be, their common characteristic is that they are commonly described with the help of the collective concept of '*populism*'. I would also dwell upon the theoretical approaches which are normally used at the comprehensive definition of the different kinds of populism and when these heterogeneous movements and political initiatives are attempted to be understood on the basis of their common features.

1. *Populism in the United States*

The cultural background of the 19th century American populism was the '*yeoman tradition*' which went back to the virtues of life and work of the pioneer settlers of the West. This tradition glorified rural life and proclaimed that the farmers were the basic producers of national wealth. Populist movement, appearing in the last two decades of the century, was a desperate answer to the sudden breakdown of the post-Civil War economic boom. The study examines the appearances of populist methods from Weaver still Ross Perot.

2. *Populism in Argentina*

Populism in Latin America, and especially in Argentina was stronger, more widespread and longer lasting than it was in Russia or in the United States. The '*social question*', and its solution — integration — were to become major components of Argentine populism. *Social integration* of the masses may be regarded as the ideology of the populist politics, although its significance is less as a philosophy than as an indicator of how movements were formed. As Conniff points out „the call for social integration was crucial to twentieth century populism because it simultaneously satisfied the desire for organic society, addressed the social question, promised citizen participation in government and provided a winning strategy for reform-minded groups to come to power peaceably. Integration was, in short, the ideal program for virtually anyone, except an elitist ruling group or a revolutionary opposition. It rejected both oligarchic government and socialist revolution, preferring a reformist middle ground. The populists promised to reconcile colonial and modern traditions through purposive, interventionist government.”

In Argentina, there were two populist epochs in the 20th century. *Radicalism* was the representative of '*reformist era*' populism, and *Peronism* was of the '*national developmentalist*' era. These periods are compared and analysed in the study.

3. *Populism in Hungary*

The development of Hungarian society was characterized by a belated modernization coming from outside and from above. The defeated Hungarian revolution of the mid- 19th century was unable to achieve national independence, and the country existed at first as part of the Habsburg Monarchy, and as the constituent of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after the 1867 Compromise with the Austrians, where it had a status equal to that of Austria. The period between 1867 and 1914 brought about a significant industrial boom, this was the time when the railway network of the country was developed and when Budapest, the capital became a metropolis. The German and Czech skilled workers settling down in the country and the trading Jews emigrating from Galicia played a great role in the boom. An urban-bourgeois Hungary was in the making, its glittering was in growing contrast to the backward rural countryside. However, in the relationship of the gentry and the unfolding bourgeois society the former remained the decisive one: it was not the gentry and the nobility that embourgeoised, but the thinner bourgeois stratum was adjusting itself to the gentry. Assimilation to the Hungarians was synonymous to assimilation to the values and attitudes of the gentry middle class as an Estate. Thus embourgeoisement, capitalist development and modernity were worded in contrast to the 'organically' developed character of Hungarians: those who expressed the values of Hungarians, often *confronted* them against the bourgeois-European values. The two elements of the programme of „*homeland and progress*“ could be fatally turned against each other. The story of Hungarian populism from the 1920s onwards correlates to the problems of peasantry and later with nationalism.

4. *Understanding Populism: Theoretical Frameworks*

Looking at the literature of populism we can distinguish at least five basic approaches for explanation.

These are the following: 1. class theory; 2. empiricism; 3. ideology analysis; 4. functionalist approach; and 5. discourse analysis. Nevertheless the nation of populism, and its applicability to different cultures and societies are still open to question.

ANDREAS BOECKH

POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA:
ECONOMIC CRISES AND THE RISE OF NEW DEVELOPMENT
COALITIONS

1. *Introductory Remarks*

Populism as an analytical concept has been applied to such a wide variety of political phenomena that its usefulness has often been questioned. In one of the more remarkable attempts to deal with this

elusive concept to date, it appears that more than one contributor was haunted by the suspicion that he was dealing with a catch-all term which lumped together aspects belonging in very different contexts. Considering that such diverse phenomena as radicalized farmers fighting for equity prices (in the USA), urban middle-class parties organizing and mobilizing trade unions and peasant leagues (as in some Latin American countries), romantic urban intellectuals seeking social redemption in and with the peasantry (Russia), peasant parties (as in Eastern Europe), right wing movements with the backing of small shop owners (*Poujadism* in France), and reformist military dictatorships as in Egypt and Peru have been called „populist”, one would like to know what all these things have in common to justify a single term. It almost looks as if the term „populism” is used as a residual classification for everything which cannot be labelled either liberal-democratic or socialist and is not openly fascist.

Moreover, not only do we find a bewildering variety of „populist” movements and ideologies, we also find them at rather different moments in history: Populism apparently is not even a product of a distinguishable historical period. It has been declared dead so often that one suspects that it is a particularly resistant species which pops up at the most unexpected moments. However, if there is anything predictable about populism, then it may be its association with processes of rapid transition.

In this paper, I cannot even attempt to answer the questions raised above. I shall have to restrict myself to the populism (or versions thereof) in the region I am somewhat familiar with, that is in Latin America, and even with this limited geographical scope, my conclusions will be rather tentative. Latin America comprises newly industrializing countries as well as countries which have just barely crossed the line from least developed to less developed. We find populist movements and governments in both types of countries; in some countries like Mexico and Bolivia, the question of the political integration of sizeable groups of the indigenous population is an important aspect of populist politics, in a country like Argentina, this does not even play a role; in Bolivia and Mexico, the question of land reform was a central issue, in Argentina, the populist movement was almost exclusively urban. Therefore, even in one historically and culturally well defined region generalizations about the populism in Latin America are a risky business.

Ford practical purposes, I shall follow the definition of Latin American populism offered by Torcuato S. di Tella which describes populism as „a political movement which enjoys the support of the mass of the urban working class and/or the peasantry but which does not result from the autonomous organizational power of either of these sectors. It is also supported by non-working-class sectors upholding an anti-status quo ideology” (*Di Tella*).

Unlike *di Tella*, I am not so much interested in the classification of different types of populism. I shall analyze the populist movements and governments in the context of various economic crises, turning first to the economic crisis which began 1930. The economic crises simultaneously were unresolved cries of political hegemony in the respective societies (Part II). These combined economic and political crises gave rise to new power contenders with a different approach to development who formed new development coalitions, and who redefined the role of the state in the process of development (Part III). In spite of considerable variations in style and content, the new movements and governments displayed a certain similarity with respect to their ideologies and techniques of political mobilization, integration and control (Part IV). The relative success and the crisis of the populist government and movements depended very much on whether or not the distributive policies could be sustained economically and politically (Part V). In spite of the fact that populist movements and governments are generally considered as short-lived phenomena, they in fact did have lasting effects on Latin American societies and their development patterns. They certainly produced more than just inflated rhetoric. Therefore it will be worthwhile to evaluate their achievements (and failures) in the process of the economic, social and political modernization of their countries (Part VI). In a final section, it will be asked if there are any parallels between the Latin American experiences with populism and its demise on the one hand and the post-socialist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe on the other (Part VII). It goes without saying that in a short paper such a range of topics can be dealt with only in a very sketchy fashion.

SZABÓ MÁRTON

METAPHORIC POLITICS

In the present writing it is attempted to determine the status of metaphor in political discourse and to describe its most important characteristics. Absolute political metaphor as the essence of politics is analysed and the character of political metaphors constricting reality, conducting action, creating identity and manipulation is presented. The paper represents the view that political metaphor is not simply an effective image, but it is a constructive element of political parlance, as it is particularly suited to satisfy the requirements of political discourse and it significantly influences the sensing and handling of political problems and the setting of political perspectives.

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