
ABSTRACTS

KÖRÖSÉNYI, ANDRÁS

THE DIVIDED REPUBLIC

The distribution of power in Hungary 1990–1992

The article deals with the question of centralisation or division of power in Hungarian politics in two main dimensions: firstly of *political institutions*, and secondly of *social actors*. In the first dimension it examines how far public decision-making is concentrated in the different branches of power and political institutions. In the second dimension the question is what social groups have access, and to what extent, to political power or influence. Is there a united political class, a ruling elite, or is political power and influence divided among different groups. The article uses the framework of Lijphart's majoritarian and consociational model of democracy. Reviewing the institutional factors of the model, the author concludes that political power is to a considerable degree shared in Hungary. It is shared in two ways: among different institutions in terms of the system of government, and among different political forces and parties.

ENYEDI, ZSOLT

PILLAR AND SUBCULTURE

A possible conceptual framework of cultural-political segmentation

The first part of the paper gives an overview of the theories which depict the social-political structure of the Western-European plural societies. Special attention is paid to definitions of such concepts as „political subculture”, „pillar” and „pillarization”. The most important approaches concerning the institutionalized segmentation in the Low Countries (the cradles of the pillarization theory) are contrasted. In the second part it is shown by Dutch and Belgian examples how pillarized systems work in practice. Arguing for the relevance of the

subculture/pillar model in Hungary, the author draws attention to the recent proliferation of subculturally bound organizations at the end of the paper. The basic concepts of cultural-political divisions are re-defined in order to make them fit the Hungarian case.

ALFRED STEPAN—CINDY SKACH

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

The struggle to consolidate the new democracies, especially those in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia has given rise to a wide-ranging debate about democratic *political* institutions and *political* markets. This literature has produced provocative hypotheses about the effects of institutions on democracy. To date, these works have focussed primarily on electoral systems, party systems and legislatures in developed countries. They form part of the „neo-institutionalist” literature in comparative politics which holds as a premise that „political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions”.

A fundamental political-institutional question which has only recently received serious scholarly attention concerns the impact of different constitutional frameworks on democratic consolidation. Little systematic cross-regional evidence has been brought to bear on this question. This is unfortunate, because constitutions are essentially „meta-institutional frameworks”. In functioning democracies they provide the basic decision-rules and incentive systems concerning government formation, the conditions under which governments can continue to rule, and the conditions by which they can be terminated democratically. Constitutions are more than simply one of the many dimensions of a democratic system. They create much of the overall system of incentives and organization within which the other institutions and dimensions found in the many types of democracy are structured and processed.

Study shows that the range of existing constitutional frameworks in long-standing democracies in the world is less than one would think. With one exception (Switzerland), every existing democracy today is either presidential (as in the United States), parliamentary (as in most of Western Europe), or a semi-presidential hybrid of the two (as in France and Portugal, where there is a directly elected President and a Prime Minister who must have a majority in the legislature). In this essay we pay particular attention to contrasting what we call „pure presidentialism” with „pure parliamentarianism”.

Pure parliamentarianism, as defined here, has been the norm in the democratic world since World War II. However, so far, all the new aspirant democracies in Latin America and Asia (Korea and the

Philippines) have chosen pure presidentialism. In the approximately twenty-five countries that now constitute Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, to date only Hungary has chosen pure parliamentarianism.

We question this virtual dismissal of the pure parliamentary model by most new democracies. In this article we bring evidence to bear on the theoretical argument that parliamentary systems tend to increase the degrees of freedom that facilitate the momentous tasks of economic and social restructuring that face new democracies while they simultaneously attempt to consolidate democratic institutions. In fact, all our evidence points to the conclusion that the hasty embrace of presidential, and the almost total neglect of parliamentary, models should be reconsidered.

It is not our purpose in this article to give a balanced discussion of both the benefits and the drawbacks of parliamentarianism and presidentialism. Our intention is to report the findings of our analysis of numerous different sources of data, all of which point in the direction of a much stronger correlation between democratic consolidation and pure presidentialism. We believe our findings are sufficiently strong to warrant long range studies being designed with the express purpose of testing the probabilistic propositions we indicate.

